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Maryland v. Wilson: The Fading Fourth
Amendment
In Maryland v. Wilson,1 the United States Supreme Court held that
a police officer may order a passenger of a lawfully stepped car to exit
the vehicle.' This "bright-line rule" allows these intrusions as a matter
of course and does not require case-by-case determination.'
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Maryland v. Wilson concerned an attempt to suppress evidence that
arguably resulted from an unreasonable seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.4 A total of three persons, including petitioner,
were riding in a car that was stopped in Maryland for exceeding the
posted speed limit. The regular license tag had been replaced by a torn
piece of paper that read "Enterprise Rent-A-Car." Maryland State
Trooper David Hughes pulled the car over after attempting to do so for
a mile and a half.5
During the pursuit, the behavior of the two passengers aroused
Trooper Hughes's suspicions. The trooper noticed the passengers duck
below sight level and turn to look at him several times. As Hughes
approached the car after the stop was made, the driver left the car and
met Hughes halfway. The driver produced a valid Connecticut driver's
license and appeared very nervous. Upon Hughes's instruction, the
driver retrieved the rental documents from the car. At this time Hughes
noticed that the passenger in the front seat, Wilson, was sweating and
noticeably nervous. Wilson exited the car at Hughes's demand and
dropped a quantity of crack cocaine on the ground. Wilson was then
arrested and charged with intent to distribute.6

1.
2.
3.
4.
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6.

117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
Id. at 886.
See id
U.S. CoNsT. amend IV.
117 S. Ct. at 884.
Id
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At trial Wilson moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that
Hughes's order to leave the car was an unreasonable seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County
granted Wilson's motion to suppress. On appeal the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland affirmed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland denied
certiorari. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
reversed the decisions of the courts below and held that "an officer
making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending
completion of the stop."7
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Despite general agreement that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment
is to prevent unreasonable searches and seizures, the Supreme Court
has splintered when attempts have been made to translate this abstract
principle into workable guidelines.' This uncertainty has gradually
eroded the need for individual police officers to make reasoned,
discretionary decisions before intruding on an individual's personal
liberties." The result of this change has been the promulgation of
"bright-line rules," which refer to situations in which police officers are
empowered to act without discretion.'0 Maryland v. Wilson represents
the most recent step in the retreat from the discretionary probable cause
requirements,"
In Terry v. Ohio, 2 the United States Supreme Court tested the
boundaries of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures in instances that fell short of arrest. At issue
were situations in which a police officer might feel compelled to briefly
detain a person without probable cause in order to ascertain whether
that person was involved in illegal activity. The Court acknowledged
that there was "some force" to petitioner's argument that there is no type
of police activity, short of arrest, that does not require the voluntary
consent of the citizen." Nevertheless, the Court held otherwise and
declined to rely on the probable cause standard necessary for an
arrest. 14 Favoring the balancing test set forth in Camara v. Municipal
Court,' the Court stated that to be in compliance with the Fourth
7. Id. at 884, 886.
8. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
9. Id. at 528-29.
10.

Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885 n.1.

11. Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.

392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 20.
387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
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Amendment, the officer's actions in this type of situation must be
"reasonable," which is determined by "balancing the need to search (or
seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails."16 To
justify the particular invasion, the "officer must be able to point to
specific articulable facts which ... reasonably warrant that intrusion." 17 In this case the Court found that a protective search for
weapons was valid even without probable cause because it would have
been unreasonable to prevent a police officer from taking actions to
protect himself when he possesses an articulable suspicion that an
individual is armed and dangerous. 8
The Court also stated that the Fourth Amendment was meaningless
unless the officer's actions were subject to judicial review. 9 A judge
must find that the actions taken were appropriate and that an objectively reasonable police officer would have taken the same actions.2" The
Court stated that any lesser standard "would invite intrusion upon
constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial
than inarticulate hunches," which the Court previously refused to
sanction.2 ' Thus, an officer's good faith belief in the necessity of the
action taken is not enough.'
According to the Court, under this
standard the Fourth Amendment would cease to function, and people
would be subject to the whim of the police.'
The Court in Terry announced the proposition that a search of an
individual by a police officer is justified when the officer reasonably
believes that the individual is dangerous.2 The Court stressed the need
of police officers to protect themselves and reiterated the unreasonableness of forcing officers to take unnecessary risks while carrying out their
duties.2" However, the Court cautioned that the officer's assessment of
a situation must be reasonable.2 6 Action based on "unparticularized"
suspicions and hunches was not warranted by the Court.27 The Court
in 7erry ultimately held that when an officer is aware of unusual
conduct that arouses reasonable suspicion of the existence of criminal

16.
17.

392 U.S. at 20-21 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35).
Id.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24,
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 24.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id.
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activity or the possibility of danger, the officer may protect himself and
others by intruding upon personal liberties to secure the safety of the
person present.28
The case most factually similar to Maryland v. Wilson is Pennsylvania
v. Mimms," a 1977 case in which the Court enacted a "bright-line rule"
allowing a police intrusion onto personal liberty absent the suspicion of
danger.'0 The Court in Mimms considered whether it was permissible
under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer to order a driver to exit
a lawfully stopped car. Two officers observed respondent Mimms driving
with an expired license plate and stopped the car to issue a traffic ticket.
One of the officers asked Mimms to leave the car, and when Mimms
complied, the officer noticed a bulge in his jacket that turned out to be
a gun. The State freely conceded that there was no unusual behavior to
give the officer reason to be suspicious of criminal activity. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the order for Mimms to leave the
car was an impermissible seizure under the Fourth Amendment."1
The United States Supreme Court employed a balancing test, weighing
the policeman's interest in taking the action against the intrusion onto
Mimms's personal liberty.3 ' The Court stated that it is "too plain for
argument that ... the safety of the officer ... is both legitimate and
weighty."3 The Court reasoned that because Mimms was already
lawfully stopped, the additional intrusion of forcing him to leave the car
was "de minimis." s Thus, the Court held that mere inconvenience to
a driver cannot prevent an action taken in pursuit of the legitimate
concern for officer safety.3 5
In his dissent, Justice Stevens discussed the retreat from probable
cause that began with Terry and stated that "[tIoday, without argument,
the Court adopts still another-and even lesser-standard ofjustification
for a major category of police seizures."36 Justice Stevens noted that
the Court appeared to be abandoning a major protection of the Fourth
Amendment-the requirement that there be independent justification on
the specific facts of every police intrusion." Justice Stevens further

28. Id. at 30.
29.

434 U.S. 106 (1977).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

109-11.
107.
109.
110.
111.
115-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116.
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explained that the majority replaced it with a bright-line, per se rule
requiring no officer discretion whatsoever."
In Whren v. United States," decided just eight months before
Maryland v. Wilson, the Court added context to the evolution of Fourth
Amendment seizure law. The Court in Whren held that a police officer
will always be justified in making a traffic stop when probable cause
exists regardless of the subjective motivations of the officer.' Petitioner argued that a "reasonable officer" standard should be in place, forcing
the officer making the stop to justify his actions by showing that any
reasonable police officer under similar circumstances would have taken
the same action. However, the Court stated that the officer's subjective
intentions were of no importance.4 1 While Whren does mandate the
necessity of the probable cause requirement,42 this rule continued the
shift that the Court had taken towards bright-line rules and away from
discretionary police officer actions, thus paving the way for the decision
in Wilson.
III.

SUPREME COURT RATIONALE

In Wilson the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals' and held that a police officer
may order a passenger of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion and began by reviewing the
reasonableness standard under which the Court analyzes Fourth
In determining reasonableness, the Court
Amendment issues."
balances the particular public interest that necessitates an intrusion
against the individual liberty interest involved.45 Applying this test to
the facts of Wilson, the question became whether the public interest in
police safety outweighed the personal liberty intrusion that occurred
when an officer ordered a passenger to exit a lawfully stopped car to
ensure the officer's own safety."
Addressing the public interest consideration, the Court noted that the
public interest in officer safety was "weighty." 7 Recognizing that

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
Id. at 1774.
Id.
Id. at 1776.
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 885.
Id.
Id.
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traffic stops are potentially dangerous encounters, the Court stated that
the sources of danger to an officer increase with the number of passengers.4" The Court cited statistics in reference to the number of officer
assaults and fatalities resulting from traffic pursuits and stops in 1994,
which numbered 5762 assaults and 11 fatalities.'
Regarding the personal liberty consideration, the Court acknowledged
that the intrusion on a passenger is more substantial than the intrusion
on the driver."0 The Court noted that officers presumably have
probable cause to believe that the driver of a stopped vehicle has
committed some sort of vehicular traffic offense, but no reason exists to
stop or detain the passengers of that vehicle." However, because the
passengers are already stopped or detained as a result of the traffic stop,
ordering them out of the vehicle would result only in the added
inconvenience of standing outside the car rather than remaining
inside. 2
Balancing these considerations, the Court reasoned that police officer
safety is greatly enhanced when a passenger is forced to leave the car."
The Court stated "that the possibility of a violent encounter stems...
from the fact that evidence of a ... serious crime might be uncovered
during the stop. " " Inside the car, the passenger could have access to
concealed weapons possibly hidden in a variety of places throughout the
interior of the passenger compartment.6 6 The Court noted that, most
importantly, a passenger has just as much motivation as a driver to use
violence to avoid apprehension.5
Emphasizing that the risk of harm to both the police officer and the
occupants of the vehicle is minimized if the officer takes authoritative
command of the situation, the Court summarized that the increased
danger to officer safety justified the minimal intrusion on passengers'
personal liberty that occurs when they are forced to leave the car. 7
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy dissented. 8 Comparing Wilson
to Mimms, Justice Stevens stated that the issue in Mimms was a
"'narrow question'" concerning an "'incremental intrusion' on the liberty

48, Id.

49.
50.
51,
52.
53.
54.
55,
56.

Id.
Id. at 886.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id,
Id.
Id.

57. Id. (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 695 (1981)).
58. 117 S. Ct. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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of a person who had been lawfully seized," whereas the issue in Wilson
was the significantly different question of whether the state had the
power to seize persons who are not under suspicion of violating the
law. 9
According to both Justices Kennedy and Stephens, a police officer
should always be required to give a satisfactory explanation for seizing
a person and should not order passengers to exit a stopped vehicle
unless there are "objective circumstances making it reasonable for the
officer" to do so." Justice Stevens added that this is especially true
when "there is not even a scintilla of evidence of any potential risk to the
police officer." 1
Justice Stevens pointed out that while "[tihere is, unquestionably, a
strong public interest in minimizing [officer] assaults and fatalities," the
statistical information cited by the majority failed to support the
conclusion that officer safety would be enhanced as a result of the
Court's decision. 2 Justice Stevens argued that the statistics cited did
not address how many of the assaults involved passengers." Assuming
that some of the assaults did involve passengers, no information was
provided comparing how many assaults occurred after the passenger was
ordered to leave the car and how many occurred when the passenger
remained inside.6' Most importantly, Justice Stevens argued that
"there is no indication that any of the assaults occurred when there was
a complete absence of articulable basis for concerns about the officer's
safety .... In short, the statistics are as consistent with the hypothesis
that ordering passengers to get out of a vehicle increases the danger of
assault as with the hypothesis that it reduces the risk." 5 Thus, the
statistics did not support the conclusion that a police officer is in less
danger when a passenger is ordered out of a car than when a passenger
remains in the car.6
Justice Stevens claimed that most traffic stops involve "law-abiding
citizens who have committed minor traffic offenses." 7 The implication
is that the majority of traffic stops presents no danger to police

59. Id. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing and concurring with Justice Stevens's
conclusion).
61. Id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id
67. Id. at 888.
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officers." The reality is that the "unnecessary invasion" allowed by the
majority to ensure officer safety will be "imposed on innocent citizens"
in the tremendous number of daily traffic stops." Justice Stevens cited
statistics showing that because routine stops far outnumber those in
which an officer is actually at risk, any benefit toward officer safety is
marginal."
An officer would almost certainly have a reasonable
suspicion of danger in most situations posing an actual threat, thereby
justifying the order for the passenger to leave the car even in the
absence of the bright-line rule.7 1
Justice Stevens acknowledged the majority's reasoning that the
intrusion into the personal liberty of passengers ordered out of a lawfully
stopped car may be minimal in individual circumstances.72 However,
he responded that there are "countless citizens who cherish individual
liberty and are offended, embarrassed, and sometimes provoked by
arbitrary-official commands" and reasoned that these citizens would not
consider the intrusion insignificant.73 Furthermore, the aggregate of
the "thousands upon thousands" of these intrusions upon innocent
passengers clearly outweighed the safety concerns of the majority.74
In summary, Justice Stevens wrote that "[tihe Constitution should not
be read to permit law enforcement officers to order innocent passengers
about simply because they have the misfortune to be seated in a car
whose driver has committed a minor traffic offense."75 Justice Stevens
reiterated that seizures should be supported by "specific and articulable
facts."76 As Justice Kennedy proclaimed, "Liberty comes not from
officials by grace but from the Constitution by right."77
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court in Wilson noted that while the Court has
"generally eschewed bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context,"
there is no absolute standard that per se rules must be avoided in the
search and seizure context.7 ' The decision in Wilson actually represented yet another step toward hard and fast bright-line rules and away

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 887.
Id. at 888.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id. at 891 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
117 S. Ct. at 885 n.1.
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from discretionary decision making. Reasonableness is at the very heart
of the Fourth Amendment and can generally be approached by balancing
tests."" Bright-line rules formulated by the Court in Mimms and
Wilson eliminate discretion from the process and, arguably, significantly
weaken the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment.80
Wilson represented a major break from Mimms. In Mimms the driver
was at least suspected of a traffic violation.8 ' In Wilson the Court
extended the Mimms rationale to cover passengers, both in circumstances when no probable cause exists to believe that the passengers have
committed a crime and in situations when there is no reason to believe
that there exists any potential risk to the police officer.8 2
The most obvious, and potentially most serious, ramification of the
result in Wilson is the possibility that the police officers may be further
authorized to intrude upon the personal liberties of persons who are
under no criminal suspicion whatsoever. The question must be asked
whether the impact of this decision will fall more squarely on the
shoulders of some particular groups than on others. Professor James Q.
Wilson, in a reference to the Terry decision, recommended that police
increase the use of frisks in the pursuit of safety.s However, he
acknowledged that "[yloung black and Hispanic men" would probably be
affected more than others." Without Fourth Amendment protection in
these types of situations, the individual liberties of citizens may be
overwhelmed by a public interest that is less than significant in a
particular situation.
It is also not clear how this bright-line rule will be implemented in a
variety of cases beyond the standard private car driver and passenger
situation. According to the rule, passengers of commercial taxicabs and
buses, including school buses and buses transporting the elderly, are
subject to being ordered from the vehicle. 5 This possibility conjures
the vision of children or the elderly being forced to wander the side of a
busy highway during a downpour. Justice Stevens stated that "[tihe
Constitution should not be read to permit law enforcement officers to

79. Id. at 884-85.
80. See id. at 889 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Ohio u. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996),
the Supreme Court adopted yet another bright-line rule that the Fourth Amendment does
not require police officers to inform lawfully detained persons that they are free to go in
order for a search to be considered voluntary. Id. at 420-21.
81. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 107.
82. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
83. James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, § 6
(Magazine), at 46.
84. Id.
85. See 117 S. Ct. at 889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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order innocent passengers about simply because they have the misfortune to be seated in a car whose driver has committed a minor
offense.""
In Whren the Supreme Court held that a police officer's motives are
irrelevant as long as the officer can point to objective evidence that a
traffic violation has occurred." Even though pretextual stops were not
forbidden, the Court insisted upon a reasoned explanation for the
stop."
Nevertheless, because the complexity of the traffic codes
renders most drivers guilty of some violation in most instances, the
practical result of Whren is that the police can stop vehicles in almost
any circumstance.8 9 Justice Kennedy, arguing in the Wilson dissent,
predicted that when Wilson is coupled with Whren, the net result is one
that gives police the authority to arbitrarily control "millions of
passengers."' Under Whren a police officer can virtually per se stop
any vehicle on the road. 1 With the addition of Wilson, the same officer
can order the driver and all passengers out of the car." The serious
implication is that these rulings may increase traffic stops that are made
for the reason of evacuating the car in hope of discovering evidence of
some illegal activity." The combination of Wilson and Whren has
potentially rendered the Fourth Amendment inapplicable in traffic stop
situations.
GREGORY LINEBERRY
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Id.
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776.
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Id. at 1777.
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 890 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.

